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NAVAL MINE WARFARE ESSAY CONTEST-SECOND PRIZE 
Sponsored by the Mine Warfare Association 
REIMAGINE OFF NSIVE 
Cooperative, mobile mines will change the 
nature of mine warfare. 
BY LIEUTENANT CHRISTOPHER HEVEY, U.S. NAVY, AND 
MAJOR ANTHONY POLLMAN, U.S. MARINE CORPS (RETIRED) 
T he Navy's offensive mine-war-fare capability gap widens every year, as doctrinal foundations 
erode. Without significant and purpose-
ful research, development, testing, and 
evaluation efforts, the Navy is likely to 
find itself entirely on the defensive end 
of mine warfare for the next several de-
cades. To inform such research efforts, 
a cohort within the Systems Engineer-
ing Department at the Naval Postgrad-
uate School looked to history for guid-
ance. The first known use of mobile 
mines-in a minor naval footnote to the 
American Revolutionary War known 
as "The Battle of the Kegs"- led the 
team to pose the question: What would 
a 2 I st-century equivalent to that battle 
look like? 
THE BATTLE OF THE KEGS 
In 1775, David Bushnell designed and 
built America's first combat subma-
rine, the Turtle. As important, if less of-
ten recognized, is that he also proved 
that gunpowder can ignite underwater. 
This niche expertise, with support from 
clockmaker Isaac Doolittle, produced 
the first mechanically triggered time 
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bomb. In September 1776, the Conti-
nental Anny employed the Turtle and a 
clock-fuzed bomb as an integrated com-
bat system in an attempt to sink a British 
ship-of-the-line in New York Harbor. 
The attempt failed. However, in re-
alizing that the Turtle was impractical, 
Bushnell redirected his efforts to other 
offensive designs, and in less than a 
year, he again attempted to sink a British 
man-of-war. Concealed by the darkness 
of night, a small whaling boat towed 
two gunpowder-filled floating kegs into 
Niantic Bay. Using the current, he re-
leased the kegs in the direction of the 
British 28-gun frigate Cerberus. The 
frigate's nearby tender, a schooner, 
snared one keg. Sailors on that boat at-
tempted to hoist the keg aboard, igniting 
the contact fuse. The resulting detona-
tion killed four British seamen and sank 
the schooner. Even though the Cerberus 
emerged unscathed, the attack caused 
the ship to sortie back to Newport, 
Rhode Island, to inform Royal Navy su-
periors of the new threat. 
During a third attempt in Philadelphia 
Harbor in 1778, Bushnell increased the 
number of mines employed to 20 to im-
prove the probability of success. Again 
relying on the prevailing current, the 
mines missed their mark, as the ships 
had anchored specifically to avoid 
hull-damaging ice floes in the Dela-
ware River. Though the British fleet 
suffered no losses in the attack, Royal 
Navy commanders were so frightened 
by the explosion of one of the mines 
against a fishing boat that their forces 
spent the remainder of the night and 
the majority of the next day shooting 
at anything afloat. Author and com-
poser Francis Hopkinson wrote a pro-
paganda ballad recounting the attack 
as "The Battle of the Kegs." 
Though mines inflicted very little 
physical damage in the Revolutionary 
War, they created enough uncertainty 
to force a ship-of-the-line to get under 
way from anchorage in the middle of 
the night- a significant effect on an ad-
versary for a few kegs of gunpowder. 
Furthermore, provoking frigate captains 
to command their crews to fire rounds 
into the Delaware River to protect their 
ships, when their logistic stronghold 
was on the other side of the Atlantic 
Ocean, is evidence of the disorder that 
using mines offensively can cause. 
Offensive mine warfare works be• 
cause, as the British fleet experienced, 
a mere indication the threat exists will 
influence an adversary's decision•mak-
ing. This remains true today, as very 
few sensors can reliably detect mines 
underwater. Even when mines are la. 
cated, sophisticated and expensive sys-
tems are needed to defang them. With 
the rapid development of advanced 
technology in the 21st century, the time 
has come to reimagine offensive min-
ing in support of controlling today's 
maritime environment. 
GAUGING THE CAPABILITY GAP 
Today, Navy fighter and maritime pa• 
trol aircraft, along with Air Force stra-




tegic bombers, can carry and deliver Quickstrike mines. 
However, regardless of whether balloon parachutes or 
folding-fin-retarder tailkits are used, Quickstrike mines 
require specific deployment envelopes, typically below 
500 feet in altitude and 300 knots in airspeed. These 
restrictions do not pose a significant survivability risk 
when the mines are deployed defensively, to protect 
U.S. or allied territorial seas and associated national air-
space, which are generally uncontested. But in offensive 
mining, there is a high probability that friendly aircraft 
would face adversarial antiaircraft systems, perhaps as 
far out as the edge of the exclusive economic zone or 
even international airspace in substantial conflict. 
At present, Navy surface ships can deploy neither of-
fensive nor defensive mine systems. Submarine fleets 
The Wreck Interior Exploration Vehicle (WIEVLE) was devel-
oped at the Naval Postgraduate School for use Inside sub-
merged wrecks, but Its tunnel-thruster propulsion system and 
nonmetallic construction could make It Ideal as the basis for a 
swarming mine system. 
are capable of launching mines, but both the Mk 60 
Captor encapsulated torpedo and the Mk 67 Submarine 
Launched Mobile Mine were withdrawn from service, in 
2001 and 2012, respectively. The former lent itself well 
to sea control, while the latter was used for sea denial. 
Furthermore, the mines that remain in the Navy's in-
ventory have the same tactical value as their predeces-
sors-"weapons that wait." But is this truly an advan-
tage? Once minefields are laid, whether offensive or 
defensive, they remain in place until detonated or phys-
ically removed. As conflicts evolve, sea-control and 
sea-denial efforts follow, but the mines remain static, and 
they also are independent, lacking the ability to network 
with either each other or operational forces. Disarm-
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ing them is possible only with the intervention of highly 
trained operators. 
Current U.S. mines cannot distinguish friend from foe. 
In a sea-denial scenario, therefore, minefields may dis-
suade the enemy from leaving port, but they also prevent 
the Navy from gaining access to the area denied to the en-
emy. In sea-control scenarios, minefields make entire op-
erational areas high risk. Only robust information sharing 
about mine placement mitigates this risk. 
The Navy's expertise dedicated to mine warfare, re-
sponsible for doctrine and operations, has deteriorated to 
a point of near nonexistence. The Navy currently employs 
only two minefield planners-a retired Coast Guard cap-
tain and a surface ordnance limited duty officer. To com-
pensate, the Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Devel-
opment Center has invested considerable time and effort 
in training antisubmarine and antisurface warfare tac-
tics instructors (WTls) on mine warfare. But the enlisted 
crews required to conduct offensive mine warfare opera-
tions do not exist. Mineman {MN) rated billets are detailed 
exclusively to Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships, 
where they perform no offensive mining duties at all. 
In short, the Navy lacks modem mines, platforms to de-
liver them, and sailors tactically knowledgeable enough to 
employ them offensively. 
THE FORWARD EDGE OF OFFENSIVE MINING 
To address all three deficiencies, mine systems will re-
quire more than routine hardware and software updates; 
they will require a complete redesign. For the sake of 
expediency-a critical parameter-system designers 
should start from existing unmanned or autonomous un-
derwater vehicles (UUVs/AUVs) as integration plat-
forms. Researchers at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) have developed the Wreck Interior Exploration 
Vehicle (WIEVLE), a system designed to explore con-
fined, submerged spaces such as shipwrecks. But it is ca-
pable of carrying a variety of payloads. The interior vol-
ume could easily manage sensor. communication, and 
even explosive payloads, all while allowing the vehicle 
to maneuver both quietly and efficiently. 
WIEVLE has small magnetic and acoustic signatures 
compared with other AUVs. Though mine casings are tra-
ditionally machined from steel, advances in manufactur-
ing now allow for spherical shells to be injection-molded 
or 3D printed with high-grade carbon fiber or plastics. 
A mine made from such materials would be extremely 
difficult to detect, except perhaps visually. Legacy mine 
systems create a large acoustic signature during launch 
and delivery, but WIEVLE uses a quiet integrated tun-
nel-thruster propulsion system. reducing both its acoustic 
profile and the probability of detection. A thruster system 
embedded within a tunnel is also unlikely to foul on un-
dersea vegetation, a significant advantage in the littorals. 
Though signature reductions and propulsion efficien-
cies are vital, they are insufficient. The greatest innova-
tion will come from using next-generation software to 
combine individual mines into a swarming minefield. 
High-level functions to support swarming-including 
an electoral hierarchy of lead/follow relationships, ar-
tificial intelligence and machine-learning (Al/ML) pro-
cesses, and optical communication mesh network topol-
ogies-already exist in commercially available software. 
As part of a swann network, the individual mines and 
systems could continuously self-assess and monitor adja-
cent systems to elect ranks within a tiered hierarchy con-
struct that abide by lead/follow relationships. NPS's Ad-
vanced Robotic Systems Engineering Laboratory aerial 
drone systems already use such hierarchies. 
In addition, integrating Al/ML and sensor technologies 
such as passive sonar alongside legacy target-detection de-
vices would allow for highly accurate classification and 
identification of contacts. That would pennit Al/ML algo-
rithms to initiate a temporary disarming and standoff pro-
tocol within the mine system to manage safe passage for 
friendly vessels. Conversely, the same tools would be able 
to initiate a swarm response across the network against 
hostile contacts. This "invisible fence" protocol would 
support sea-denial and sea-control mission areas without 
hindering the Navy's ability to move in and through them. 
Given expectations that communication and navi-
gation systems will be degraded or denied in any com-
ing fight, the mine system should rely on high-fidelity 
blue-green laser optical communications. In February 
2020, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems success-
fully tested its Airborne Laser Communication Sys-
tem with satellites in geosynchronous earth orbit, with 
data rates 300 times greater than conventional radio-fre-
quency satellite communications. Blue-green lasers can 
pass through hundreds of feet of seawater, eliminating 
the need for the mine system to surface to communicate. 
This also would allow mines to be deployed in a meshed 
network topology. Metcalfe 's Law of networked systems 
suggests the effectiveness of such a minefield might scale 
to the square of the number of systems connected. Thus, 
ten networked mines would be ten times more effective 
than ten independent mines, and so forth. This is critical 
because the projection of power is directly proportional 
to the level of fear instilled in adversarial forces, as the 
Battle of the Kegs showed. 
WEAPONS THAT WON'T WAIT 
If the Navy is deploying an offensive minefield, the op-
erating environment will certainly be highly contested, 
making survival of the mine-launching platfonn a chal-
lenge. Low-radar-cross-section surface platfonns, such as 
littoral combat ships, Zumwa/t-dass destroyers, and un-
manned vehicles, could be used to deliver mine swanns 
at the edge of territorial waters. The envisioned mine sys-
tem also could be deployed from Mk 68 submarine tor-
pedo tubes or dry-dock shelters during clandestine opera-
tions, or even from aircraft. At 12 nautical miles offshore, 
the mine swann could submerge and travel to the coast, 
coordinated and controlled by Defense Department op-
tical communication satellites in geosynchronous orbit. 
The Navy will not be able to maintain maritime dom-
inance with weapons that wait- patiently hoping a hos-
tile ship happens across a minefield will be insufficient. 
Technological advances provide the opportunity to rev-
olutionize mine weapon systems and doctrine, allow-
ing planners to send the mines to seek out hostile forces. 
Cooperative, mobile mines that leverage modem inno-
vations-much like Bushnell's "kegs"- will inform a 
dynamic sea-control and -denial strategy aimed at instill-
ing fear and uncertainty in adversaries, whether they are 
moored in their homeports or conducting open-ocean op-
erations. To be sure, technical challenges await and re-
quire addressing, but the time to reimagine and realize 
the potential of offensive mining has arrived. 
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